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LETTER
Reply to Krueger: Good point,
wrong paper
In his letter, Krueger (1) raises an important issue regarding
questions of prediction of behavior from tests of underlying
mental states. We think it is important to make the distinction
here between using the implicit association test (IAT) for di-
agnostic purposes (e.g., to classify individuals as ‘racist’) and
using the IAT for research purposes (i.e., to investigate a po-
tential contributing factor to trust behavior in our study) (2). We
emphatically agree with Krueger (1) that, in its current in-
stantiation, the IAT should not be used for diagnostic purposes.
Indeed, the concern of Krueger (1) is exactly the one that we
would raise ourselves if anyone attempted to use test scores
to isolate individuals and hold them responsible. We have always
explicitly eschewed such a notion. No test perfectly predicts
behavior, including those tests that are often used for selection.
The IAT, as currently implemented, is a research and educa-
tional technique, not a selection technique; although relevant
when considering future uses of the IAT, the concerns of
Krueger (1) do not apply here.
Our stated goal was to determine whether there was evi-
dence of a behavioral link between two distinct psychological
variables (disparity in trust behavior and implicit racial bias as
measured by the IAT). We were motivated by evidence for
a common neural substrate, but the fact that we found a corre-
lation was not a foregone conclusion. We did not make the
claim that one’s IAT score was diagnostic of whether one was
‘racist’ in their trust behavior (2). Trust estimations are complex,
and the evidence from our own study (2) and others suggested
that they covaried with many factors, both explicit and implicit.
We showed that the extent to which trust estimations varied
with respect to a partner’s race can be predicted in part by their
IAT scores—in addition to and independently of other factors
(2). As such, the correlation between one’s IAT score and trust
behavior was an important indicator of the degree to which
implicit attitudes may contribute to trust decisions.
The ﬁnding that, on average, there was little discriminatory
trust behavior is not novel (3) and was supported by our original
neuroimaging ﬁnding (4). In that study, there was little overall
difference in the amygdala response to black vs. white faces but
a signiﬁcant correlation between implicit racial bias and amyg-
dala activation. The presence of this correlation in the absence
of a correlation between an explicit measure of race bias and
amygdala activity was a theoretically important discovery.
We found a signiﬁcant correlation between IAT test scores
and trust behavior (2). This result meant that those individuals
with stronger pro-white IAT scores were more likely to discrim-
inate against blacks, not that they would deﬁnitely do so.
Although Krueger (1) is right to worry about the potential
misuse of the IAT in a diagnostic capacity, he is off-base in
making that point about a paper (2) that showed, consistent with
mounting evidence from dozens of studies (5), that implicit
measures of attitudes and beliefs predicted ecologically
realistic behavior.
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